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CHAPTER 7
THE MORAL SINGULARITY OF MILITARY PROFESSIONALISM
ROGER WERTHEIMER
Introduction: For the last century and more, professionalism has been the 
dominant concept of our military’s self-image and self-ideal. Central to the concept of 
professionalism is a distinctive concept of responsibility: the concept of professional 
responsibilities. That general concept has both individualist and collectivist elements, and
since militaries have a distinctive inherent collectivist dynamic, unlike other professions 
and other organizations, our military’s conception of professional responsibilities has 
distinctive collectivist components.
This is not well understood by military professionals, so military professionalism 
is not well understood by them. That’s partly because this is not well understood by 
military ethicists whose work should illuminate such matters. The available philosophical
frameworks for understanding the moral character of military professionalism are well 
represented by the work of Michael Walzer and Richard Schoonhoven, whose essays 
book end the prior essays of this volume. In Walzer’s case, I refer more to the work his 
present essay refers to, his seminal Just and Unjust Wars1 which promotes a collectivist 
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conception of military responsibility that aims to explain and justify a moral principle he 
dubbed ‘the moral equality of soldiers’.  The framework Schoonhoven’s essay represents 
is implicit there and explicit in the extensive writings it cites of Jeff McMahan. Like 
McMahan, Schoonhoven denies the moral equality of combatants by relying on an 
insistently individualist conception of responsibility.2 
Their topic takes them to the heart of military professionalism, yet Walzer’s and 
Schoonhoven’s arguments (and those of McMahan and many others) hardly mention 
military professionalism at all. Their competing analyses jointly present the profound 
dilemma military professionals confront regarding their professional conduct when they 
believe their nation has no right to be warring. That ethos doesn’t resolve the dilemma; it 
provides no coherent specific principle on this matter; it is irredeemably ambivalent and 
conflicted here. As the more reflective among them sometimes sense, military 
professionals really don’t know what to believe about this matter.3 
Moral  Precariousness: The dilemma is rooted in the peculiar inherent 
precariousness of the morality of warrior work that distinguishes the practice of warrior 
skills from that of civilian professions and other respectable occupations. The ethical 
codes of civilian professions derive primarily from the specific ends and means of their 
work, its defining goals and appropriate activities for achieving those goals. The defining 
goals are distinctive benefits for the client, specific interests served, like restoration of 
health, acquisition of knowledge, and so on. The work of a professional has inherently 
valuable ends; it is well worth doing, and not just for the money. Further, the practice (the
exercise of the professional skills, the activity attaining the goals) is normally benign. 
While achieving a legitimate professional goal may occasionally require harming 
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someone, the client or others, generally the harms are mostly minor, incidental, and not 
inherent in the activity or its goal. In brief, professional codes of ethics presume that the 
profession's distinctive aims are laudable and its means are (normally) morally 
unproblematic.
In contrast, the warrior’s goal is victory in violence. Victory never itself 
legitimates the violence. Only the cause for violence can do that. The warrior’s skill and 
success are neutral among causes. Professional proficiency is measured by efficacy in 
battle, contribution to victory, not by the validity of the cause. Further, the work of the 
warrior is the deliberate infliction of the greatest evils on other persons, subjugation or 
death. Death, disablement, destruction of other people’s goods, these are not inessential, 
incidental or peripheral consequences of military activity; these are the effects the 
warrior’s tools and skills are specifically designed to cause. Absent some extrinsic 
legitimation,  acts having such effects are monstrous, howling wrongs. In sum, the 
distinctive expertise of the profession of arms is a skill at causing intrinsic moral evils 
that cry for justification, while the profession's inherent goal is morally neutral.4  
That sounds awful, and in the word's root sense it is, but it is not an indictment or 
criticism of the military. It's no ethical defect, no cause for shame or embarrassment that 
its work is inherently morally risky. Warring cannot but be a nasty, ghastly business, and 
it is very liable to be a great crime. There's no way around that.
This is a sensitive matter, frequently misunderstood and fiercely resisted, so 
though the point is plain and simple we need to dwell on this awhile to dispel some 
common distracting confusions. Throughout keep in mind that the problem presented is 
not whether warrior work is justifiable, but how, and the point thus far is only that the 
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framework of functionalist reasoning applicable to civilian professions cannot work for 
military professionals.
Now, while some have denied it, we can take as a given that someone's got to 
fight our battles and do our killing for us. The military has the grand, grim duty of 
defending the nation, and to that end the killing and destruction may be necessary, 
justifiable, righteous work, worthy of great honor and glory. Military might has other uses
no less noble, like the defense of allies and of the oppressed in humanitarian 
interventions. Certainly, the goods attained by medical work, protecting human health 
and life, may also be attained by warrior work – and the work of plumbers and computer 
technicians – but those goods are extrinsic to these occupations. Those goods are internal 
to medical practice; the tools and skills of that practice are designed specifically to 
achieve those goals, and they are evaluated by their proficiency in that pursuit. Those 
goods do not guide the design of grenades and napalm bombs, or the development of 
skills in their effective employment. The warrior’s tools and attendant skills are evaluated
and evaluable by their proficiency, not in saving lives, but in causing death and 
destruction. And, note well, in the development and evaluation of the tools and skills, the 
identity of the victims is irrelevant.
Nothing here devalues national security as the paramount proper use of a nation’s 
military, but no such extrinsic, distal goal identifies the military’s distinctive nature or 
explains the distinctive character of its proper professional ethics. National security is an 
umbrella rubric, an “interest” threatened or affected by a dysfunctional economic or 
educational system and other factors outside the military purview. The military is 
distinguished not by its serving that interest, but by its serving that interest – and others 
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--- by violence (destructive power, lethal force) or its threat. More precisely, de facto and 
de jure, our military’s essential function is to further, by violence or its threat, what its 
government leaders deem to be the nation’s interest. It cannot defend without a capacity 
to aggress. Both capabilities are available for service. The military’s essential nature isn’t 
revised or reduced by deploying it only for legitimate defensive purposes, no more than 
the nature of a gun shrinks by firing it only at paper targets.5 
Predictably, these truisms are persistently obscured by double talk. Hard upon our 
WWII triumphs, it was a neat piece of Orwellian newspeak to rename the U.S. 
Department of War the “Department of Defense”. The old name was too ominous for the 
department controlling the newly world dominant military of a self-professed non-
imperialistic nation. The re-baptism signaled no shift or restriction of basic functions. The
department’s core purpose remained to use lethal force to conquer, subdue or otherwise 
enforce the cooperation of other peoples (Indians, Mexicans, Filipinos, Central 
Americans, Vietnamese, Afghanistanis, Iraqis and the rest) to serve politically influential 
American interests -- annexing the conquered territory when convenient or otherwise 
effectively controlling it without occupying or colonizing it. Engagements to repel an 
invasion of the homeland are singular. Clear compliance with principles of justice has 
been occasional, and often almost coincidental.
The renaming was motivated by political realities; it didn’t revise them.  
Legislation restricting military activities to “defense” is also subject to revision by 
political realities, as Japan’s shipping soldiers to Iraq shows. Terms like "national 
security" and “defense” have virtually unlimited rhetorical elasticity, readily expanded 
from repelling a territorial incursion to protecting any of a people’s interests, legitimate or
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not, and on to proactively promoting any such interest – till we get a government 
proclaiming that defense of our nation necessitates invasion of a distant, militarily 
crippled nation that is not attacking us, nor equipped to, nor preparing to (since any 
attempt would be a national-suicide bombing) – nor really seeming to. Overtly or 
covertly revising the definition of "national security" or “defense” may inspire or require 
revision of terms defining it or defined by it. When our political and media propagandists 
first allege that preventive war is justified as a necessary defensive strategy against 
terrorists, and then designate as “terrorist” all who combat our invasion and occupation of
their homeland, our propagandists nicely preempt the use of “offensive” or "aggressive" 
to condemn any military act we indulge in.6 
The all too prevalent current characterizations of warrior work in such terms as 
“defense” only mask the moral precariousness of that work. Such stipulations hope to 
remove the troubling precariousness by treating a possible extrinsic good of the activity 
as an essential intrinsic good that secures its justification. This hollow verbal victory 
turns a whole cluster of terms like “warrior”, “military”, “armed forces” etc. into 
honorifics whose application is as contestable as the determination of the goal some agent
or agency is pursuing, and it kicks down the road what to call those exercising the same 
skills in the same kind of activity for other purposes. Such stipulations are unsustainable: 
they inevitably motivate an expansion of the definiens, “defense”, to make the 
definiendum “warrior” apply much as before, and that makes the imputed intrinsic goal 
into something that justifies nothing.
The morally precarious position of the military has only dismal civilian 
counterparts.7 That position is not the lot of lawyers with professional obligations to serve
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their client's interests in legal “battles”, despite the unrighteousness of the client's cause 
and the losses for others. The adversarial character of the legal profession is unusual for 
civilian professions and unlike a military’s adversarial nature in many morally significant 
respects. First off, much legal work is not adversarial or a threat to anyone’s interest (e.g.,
writing wills, negotiating mutually agreeable arrangements), and it is often adversarial 
without damaging anyone (society benefits when it unsuccessfully prosecutes innocent 
persons), and even when the outcome damages one party, the legal proceedings 
themselves are not inherently condemnable: they needn't discomfit anyone, beyond, 
perhaps, embarrassing a witness. Beyond all that, the “battles” of legal adversaries are 
regulated by rules and policies – including their professional code – designed 
(imperfectly) to promote the discovery of truth and the justice of the result. By contrast, 
the war rules within which warriors today work do not, in intent or effect, favor those 
with justice on their side or disadvantage aggressors. Instead, current war conventions 
prohibit the pursuit of natural justice and the punishment of captive combatants, however 
deserved it may be. Nations wisely sign on because generally every nation benefits, 
aggressors and defenders, victors and vanquished. In this respect our war rules are 
insistently amoral. 
And so are our codes of military professionalism. Civilian professional skill put to
an ignoble purpose (as when a physician masterminds undetected murders) is a 
perversion of the profession, a misuse of those skills. A warrior’s dutiful service in 
wrongful aggression is rarely deemed dishonorable, let alone “unprofessional”.  
Again, the moral precariousness of warrior work is not that practitioners may find 
themselves ordered to do something god awful. That circumstance may equally befall the 
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nonmilitary government personnel under a vicious regime. The profession of arms is 
morally problematic because, unlike civilian professions and other government work, 
there is a very clear and very strong moral presumption against its primary activity. That 
presumption is overcome when a warrior fights on the side of justice. That fact further 
locates the precariousness of the warrior’s position and doesn’t eliminate it. The problem 
confronting military professionals is not that of jus ad bellum, the problem of whether 
and when nations may rightly war. The warrior’s question is not whether and when 
individual warriors, acting like mini-nations, may rightly duel or privately battle to death.
Rather, the question is whether a society’s warriors may justifiably do their work when 
and because their government so commands. 
If military professionalism is modeled on civilian professionalism the answer 
must be: no. Civilian professionals are autonomous agents; the decision to ply their skills 
is not outside their control. No contract or oath can – legally or morally -- bind a civilian 
professional to maim and kill innocent (non-aggressing) people; no such commitment 
eliminates or much reduces the agent’s legal and moral accountability. The agent might 
have some justification or excuse for doing whatever she is bidden if she could 
reasonably believe that her client/employer would never direct her to participate in a 
heinous wrong. As things are, no one can reasonably believe that about any nation.
Certainly, it matters that a warrior is serving her nation rather than making a 
living as a mercenary. The question remains: how does that matter, given that elsewhere a
governmental directive does not by itself suffice to justify compliance independent of any
consideration of its righteousness? Military victory is not an impersonal good like health 
or knowledge. It is inherently a good for the victor, and inherently an evil for the 
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vanquished, so it is inherently morally unlike health and knowledge. Other people don’t 
have your reasons for improving your health or your knowledge, but no one need have 
any reason to oppose your attainment of those goods. The asymmetry here is crucial.  The
partiality civilian professionals can or must have regarding their clients’ good is 
consonant with universalist principles of justice. A warrior’s partiality for her people may
be unproblematic within a tribal morality. How a warrior’s lethal partiality is compatible 
with the universalist principles of justice of our culture is a profoundly troubling puzzle.
This last point is crucial. The moral precariousness of warrior work – the 
amorality of its distinctive goal and the presumptive immorality of its distinctive means –
is inherent to the activity, universal for all mankind (and extraterrestrials), but it does not 
present the same problem for all societies, or anyway, what comes to the same, the 
available responses differ profoundly. 8 
Many a warrior of yore was proudly unmerciful to disabled and defeated enemies 
deemed to have served an unjust cause. World-wide, pre-professional warriors have often 
been enthusiastically ruthless, glorying in plundering, pillaging, raping, enslaving, 
massacring, torturing, untroubled by any doubt that the victor may despoil the vanquished
at his pleasure. More often than not, much of such mischief has been blessed and 
motivated by communal moral codes. However horrendous, the suffering was often 
inflicted as punishment, judged fully deserved. Its justice was often the roughest, 
assigning collective guilt, unmindful of the unwillingness of anyone's participation and 
contribution in the alleged wrong. Its spirit might be hot vengeance or cold pragmatic 
calculation or self-righteous retribution or holy obligation. Clear-eyed warriors have 
deliberately drawn buckets of excessive blood, unnecessary for victory, seen the blood on
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their very own hands and did not distance themselves from it or feel dirtied by it. 
Some warriors have respected the correlative thought and refused to practice their 
deadly craft for morally repugnant causes. This too has been urged and honored by some 
cultures. Whatever the statistical frequency of such sentiments, they are stirred by 
principles of moral responsibility whose nub has as much (and as little) natural, universal 
appeal as the Golden Rule. These natural moral sentiments may be repressed but not 
readily obliterated. Whatever a culture’s warrior code may commend, a warrior with an 
open mind or a healthy human heart is vulnerable to the thought that his life might be 
befouled by his killing people for reasons he cannot respect. That thought is not 
antithetical to military professionalism. It is elemental to the ambivalence inherent in its 
ethos.
Moral Singularity: In our culture the moral precariousness of the military has 
motivated a great range of conceptions of the moral singularity of warriors expressed in 
some reluctance or resistance to regard someone’s moral responsibility for service in 
condemnable warfare in the very same way we regard a person’s moral responsibility for 
complicity in other horrendous injustices.9  People, in and out of the military, commonly 
feel that such service is, at minimum, not dishonorable. Attitudes on this vary widely, and
while they are generally vague and inchoate, their differences may be gross or finely 
nuanced. At one extreme, some people feel that (almost) any refusal to serve is 
dishonorable. At another extreme, others think themselves morally obliged to refuse 
service in an unjustified war and to publicly condemn the war and the political leaders 
and to laud those who eventually condemn themselves for their service – yet even such 
conscientious objectors are commonly reluctant to condemn those who never condemn 
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themselves for their service.
Such conceptions may be expressed in various ways. As noted earlier, while 
civilian professionals are said to act unprofessionally when they put their skills to evil 
ends, this is not said of warriors. Further, such conceptions have varied along many 
dimensions. Among the most salient (historically, conceptually, and morally) is their 
degree and kind of universalism. Nothing truly comparable to Walzer’s idea of combatant
“moral equality” is available without a background acceptance of (some version of) the 
universalist egalitarianism that took hold in the Enlightenment.
Walzer’s conception of warrior moral singularity is extreme in many respects: its 
egalitarianism, its simplicity, its incoherence. In essence, it says, for example, that while 
the nation and political leaders of Japan had no right to kill Americans at Pearl Harbor, 
and no right to command Japanese pilots to kill those Americans, nonetheless those pilots
had the right to kill those Americans just because they were so commanded. That claims 
defies comprehension.10 Happily, we have no need to try to make some sense of it, since 
nothing remotely like it is needed to make good sense of the war conventions and 
principles of jus ad bellum and jus in bello Walzer accepts along with most reasonable 
people today. Walzer cannot himself really believe what he says. His blanket absolution 
of moral responsibility for a combatant’s contributions to horrendous evils directly entails
the denial of any possibility of justified conscientious objection to military service. That 
implication is utterly unpalatable to Walzer (and most reasonable people), but it is the 
sole significant import of his principle. The whole subject of warrior moral singularity 
has near nothing to do with war conventions, crimes and institutional sanctions and 
everything to do with sin, conscience, and our extra-institutional interpersonal and 
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intrapersonal attitudes and relations. That is how Augustine conceived this matter, and 
why this matter goes to the heart of professional military ethics.
Schoonhoven’s criticisms of Walzeresque conceptions of warrior moral 
singularity are persuasive partly because they are commonsensical. As such they make it 
understandable why many a modern officer may be leery of Walzeresque conceptions of 
their moral singularity which salvage their honor by sacrificing their self respect, 
threatening their proud conception of themselves as professionals, morally responsible 
for their professional conduct. The flip side of this is that Schoonhoven leaves us 
wondering how it could be that (as he observes) many (perhaps most) military 
professionals, including relatively thoughtful ones teaching at the academies, profess 
some conception of their moral singularity, perhaps less elegant and extreme than 
Walzer’s, but still quite robust.
While Schoonhoven does not offer some alternative, minimalist conception of 
warrior moral singularity, he may represent the outer limit of positions within that range 
for he does not rule out the possibility of some such singularity. He is more cautious than 
ethicists like McMahan who suppose that any moral attitude that appears to regard a 
warrior’s moral responsibility as special in some way must be either indefensible or 
defensible by the same principles, concepts, and kinds of reasoning we properly employ 
regarding all other matters of moral responsibility, so the apparent singularity is sheer 
illusion. Anyway, in practical terms, Schoonhoven’s main disagreement with McMahan is
not insignificant but not significant enough. For both, the moral responsibility of military 
professionals differs from that of civilian professionals not at all or only in degree. 
McMahan might allow some minimal presumption favoring a warrior’s compliance with 
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a governmental directive to serve. Schoonhoven seems sympathetic to a somewhat 
stronger but still anemic presumption unacceptable by his military professional 
colleagues. 
The dilemma for military professionals is that neither Walzer nor 
Schoonhoven/McMahan offers an acceptable option, yet those are the only available 
philosophical frameworks. Western philosophy provides no alternative that makes sense 
of some compromise. It is principally our philosophical heritage -- particularly the 
universalist, egalitarian, cosmopolitan, humanitarian, liberal, individualism emerging in 
the Enlightenment -- that has made the military’s moral precariousness a peculiarly acute 
and apparently irresolvable problem. 
Enlightenment Influences: Considered geopolitically, the Enlightenment begins with 
the mid-17th century Westphalian renunciation of religious warfare and the recognition of 
states as sovereign national communities. It culminates in the early 19th century rise of 
military professionalism and the civilian control of the military that professionalism 
promotes. That development may be well conceived as the Enlightenment’s dialectical 
response to its intensification of a cultural and political problem made specially pressing 
by the Peace of Westphalia: the problem of military fealty. When a military and its 
personnel are alienated from religious motivations, and the nation they serve is a political
fiction, an artifact of state sovereignty lacking the unifying communal bonds of kinship 
and common culture, then the problem of securing military loyalty to political leaders  (a 
problem for (almost?) any human society) faces unprecedented challenges. The instability
of that political condition is aggravated as a culture becomes increasingly individualist, 
liberal, skeptical of authority, resistant to it and resentful of it, and increasingly 
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responsive to the callings of a transnational, trans-political common humanity. 
America’s military is a creature of a novel culture whose self-conception is 
documented by a resounding expression of Jeffersonian liberal egalitarianism. The 
unmistakable Enlightenment spirit shining through its founding documents has kept a 
steady pressure on the nation’s laws and every dimension of culture. That pressure will 
always meet push-back from religions with imperialistic inclinations or ritual practices 
condemned by a conception of people as free and equal responsible lives. But most 
religions feel unthreatened by Enlightenment principles most of the time, for those 
principles protect religions from one another and enable them to flourish. Our humanist, 
egalitarian liberalism is inherently at odds, not with religion, but with the military and the
ethos demanded by its organizational imperatives. The organizational totalitarianism 
needed for military proficiency is a massive, systematic violation of Jeffersonian 
democracy, its civil laws and social codes. Enlightenment principles do tolerate and 
sponsor the military’s radical subordination of citizens in its ranks, because – and only 
insofar as -- it is necessary to protect and benefit the civilian world. Our heritage had 
largely left its military leaders carte blanche to create and run a proficient military 
modeled originally on European militaries with centuries of aristocratic heritage. Over 
the last half century the civil government (executive, legislative, and judicial), often 
responding to civilian movements, has taken closer and closer control of the military, and 
called for justification of military practices and traditions in every corner of its culture. 
That trend is likely to accelerate.
Members of our military enter it with the consciences born of their national 
civilian culture and personal subcultures. Military training must reform that mindset to 
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function effectively in an authoritarian agency. That is an imperative inherent in the 
nature of a military organization. Another imperative comes from military 
professionalism’s commitment to the military’s subordination to the civil government it 
serves: military culture must evolve within the evolving civilian culture, respect it and 
stay subordinate to it.
The conscience Professional Military Ethics Education (PMEE) must shape must 
continuously struggle with the civilian conscience from which it springs, respecting it 
while resisting it, sometimes envying or admiring it, sometimes straining to tolerate it, 
sometimes enhancing itself by taking civilian ideas and practices on board and 
redesigning them to accommodate the military’s organizational imperatives. One 
consequence of this complexity is that the military conscience commonly sees its moral 
challenges and frames its inner conflicts in ways that may be opaque for civilians. 
Another consequence is that that conscience is susceptible to self-delusion due to the 
illusion of transparency natural to self-consciousness. Among its inner imperatives is a 
demand for unity, in thought and deed, throughout the organization. That demand is 
energized by its needs for decisiveness, confidence, certainty, simplicity – a cluster of 
concerns predisposing the military mind to suppose that it has some single, unified, 
coherent ethos and the primary purpose of PMEE is to transmit it. A pervasive 
assumption controlling its response to the moral conflicts it confronts is that its ethos is 
under attack from some hostile, alien ideology, so it must marshal its forces to crush this 
opponent. That is dangerously wrongheaded.  The “enemy” is within.
Military professionalism is the Enlightenment’s Trojan horse within the fortress of
the military’s ethos. The military wheeled that “enemy” in, transformed it and 
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transformed itself by professionalizing itself. The military is constrained from without by 
the Enlightenment strains of the civilian culture it serves; it is pulled from within by its 
commitment to an occupational ethos born of that culture. It has encouraged 
professionalism for its Enlightenment spirit of scientific rationality to improve technical 
proficiency. Those habits of open critical inquiry -- dissatisfied with dogma and skeptical 
of the epistemic authority of tradition and organizational authority -- transfer to its ethical
thought. Here the ethos of professionalism turns schizoid. A true professional internalizes 
the attitudes, values and principles appropriate for her occupation, so the military 
professional must somehow integrate a flexible, liberated intellectual spirit with the rigid,
authoritarian mindset of militarism. Many aspects of this conflict are controversial, but its
existence is widely recognized. Other implications of professionalism are not. 
With the end of aristocracy came the end of officership as the aristocratic 
occupation, and with the rise of liberal egalitarianism came a pervasive meritocracy and 
conceptions of dignified labor that award prestige and social status to occupations called 
professions. The term and its cognates are generally honorific, so their precise 
connotations are variable and controversial. Nowadays virtually every occupational 
grouping aspires to this aristocracy of employment.
Professionalization of the military has been a target and a mission, with 
skirmishes, battles, and marketing campaigns, in America and abroad since the 19th 
century. Military academies have, perforce, been prime targets and theatres of these 
campaigns, because professionalization means nothing without systemized education and 
training. Professional Military Education (PME) must satisfy the demands inherent in 
professionalism within the constraints of the military’s organizational imperatives. That 
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complex demand must control every policy and program of PME, especially every aspect
and detail of PMEE.
Professionalism is an Enlightenment spirit of occupational self-improvement, 
with two primary concerns, the cultivation of competence and the promotion of an ethos 
of its proper employment. Professionalizing the military resembles professionalizing 
other occupations in its raising the standards of skill and the competence of practitioners. 
As elsewhere, the big money for professionalizing goes to improving expertise, the 
technical skills that increase proficiency. Professionalization of the military ethos is not 
funded or manned on the scale of training programs for fighter pilots. It does not 
command that attention or invite the same cold, questioning eyes. 
Still, as elsewhere, the ethos of professionalism motivates its own transmission. It presses
for developing practitioners who exercise their expertise with professional integrity. 
Professionalizing the military’s ethos resembles other professionalizations in this and 
other important respects. All professional codes are alike at some level of abstraction and 
generality. Professionalism always opposes an amoral spirit of unconstrained technical 
proficiency and bottom-line cost-benefit effectiveness. Military professionalism is no less
morally serious; it is deadly serious about its codes. Civilian professional codes rarely 
have incompatible principles or values. They differ in their focus and emphasis. Each 
professional code is contoured to accommodate the profession’s distinctive goals, 
expertise and circumstances. Normally, the contouring comes from directly applying 
general ethical principles applicable to everyone to the distinctive general features of an 
occupation. Not so for the military. Its moral reasoning must take a different route.
If the morality of military professionalism is modeled on that of civilian 
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professionalism, our military is in a morally untenable position. The ethos of 
professionalism has been, as it had to be, retrofitted for military operations. Militaries are
professionalized by militarizing professionalism.
Civilian Control: American foreign policy promotes the professionalization 
of all militaries, not just those of our allies. It employs its military professionals to assist 
other nations to this end – despite the evident dangers of increasing the proficiency of all 
militaries in developing and applying massive lethal force. The intent is to foster intra-
national – and thereby, inter-national – political stability by converting others to our own 
military’s professional code, whose First Commandment is: Stay out of politics. 
Governments anxious about their military’s fealty submit them to professionalization.11
Military professionalism is premised on the civilian control of the military. 
Professionalism in the military is in the service of the political status quo. Whether this 
be desirable or deplorable is debatable, but it means that military professionals are walled
off from the political world civilian professionals inhabit. Our culture systematically 
circumscribes their practical reasoning about their professional conduct. Their moral 
reasoning about their political relations is censured when they presume to deliberate with 
the unfettered reasoning of civilians. 
The term ‘military professionalism’ may mislead, since we do call a politically 
independent organization of numerous skilled practitioners of martial arts an army, a 
military. A private army may be well moved to promote its self-improvement and 
publicize it as “professionalization” for its instituting higher standards of practitioner 
performance, improving the training and testing of skills, and inculcating a warrior ethos 
fit for a Jeffersonian democracy, a civilian warrior ethos. Since militaries share some 
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basic, broad organizational imperatives which put a premium on certain skills and 
character traits, our PMEE might profitably consider the proper ethos for such civilian 
warriors, and our military might reasonably reform its ethos upon learning how a private 
military markedly improved proficiency by adjusting its ethos and altering some 
practices. However, various factors limit our military’s interest in such social 
experiments.12 In particular, the institutionalized decoupling of the military from civil 
politics is no adventitious plank in the platform of the military professionalization 
movement. It is the cornerstone of our military’s professional ethics. Whatever the 
military advantages of a civilian warrior code (or anything else) its features are adoptable 
by our military only insofar as they are adaptable to the moral constraints imposed by our
military’s political condition.
As a modifier of ‘professionalization’ and its cognates, “military” applies solely to
a governmental agency, specifically, the agency empowered to develop and deliver 
massive deadly force. Civilian professions are not agencies. In the U.S., the medical 
profession is not the AMA; elsewhere it is not the national health service employing all 
practitioners. At its core a profession is a skill set, a valuable expertise. Generally, would 
be clients (beneficiaries of the skill) might be almost any person or organization, civil or 
government, in this or any nation. As such, professions have an apolitical or trans-
political character. On the other hand, professions have an inherent tendency to organize 
and engage in political activity. And whatever their affiliation with or participation in 
such organizations, our civilians professionals have the rights and responsibilities of 
citizens of a Jeffersonian democracy.
 Since the military’s subordination to the civil government was codified in 
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America’s Constitution before it professionalized its military, that subordination may 
seem much the same as that for all citizens, just a matter of obeying the law. That 
similarity is a bare abstraction. Our nation’s military is a state sustained semi-autonomous
world, with its own legal order, culture and ethos.
 Statutory law assigns active-duty military personnel a distinct civic status. They 
are not civilians. They are denizens of a totalitarian dictatorship welcomed within a 
liberal democracy as long as the people believe that the totalistic subordination is needed 
for their own peace and security. Military professionals have markedly less participation 
in the civic order and processes separate from their professional lives. Around and within 
the statutory structure has grown a richly textured heritage, having pre-professional roots,
of rules, customs and expectations – official and unofficial -- defining the whole public 
"conduct becoming" military personnel in general, and particularly the officers. Their 
professional responsibilities pervasively constrain their public conduct, in uniform and 
out. Military professionals respect all that and wholeheartedly embrace it. They know that
no civilian profession, individual or organization, has comparable capabilities for 
challenging or defying civil authority. Professional officers take pride in not being 
civilians and being subordinate to the civic order. (Some military professionals have 
made it a point of honor to not exercise their right to vote.) That pride honors their 
dreadful power. In return, society honors them and glorifies them as long as they 
faithfully serve their government.
This civilian control is a social contract.13 With its unsurpassable potential for 
political mischief, the military must be denied all opportunity and any right – and thus 
any obligation -- to participate in the political process determining the deployment of 
219
their power, except as technical advisors regarding their capabilities, limitations, 
likelihood of success, risks and costs of failure, and the like. Military professionals 
subordinate their will to the government, the legal authority of the society. They 
subordinate their political will, surrendering the rights and responsibilities of citizens to 
influence their government to do what they believe is right. They subordinate their 
professional will, surrendering the rights and responsibilities of autonomous agents to 
influence their employers to employ them properly, in a manner they may be rightly 
proud of. They wear a uniform marking their release from civil society and their 
subordination within a state sustained totalitarian organization that commands absolute 
obedience to their superiors, even in the face of death. All this is thought legitimated by 
providing the personnel an (allegedly) reasonably fair deal. The state supplies their basic 
material needs (food, clothing, shelter, health care), a living wage, and a retirement 
pension (below the civilian pay scale.) It supplies their physic needs by sustaining both a 
military culture that exalts their work, fosters pride in themselves and their occupation, 
and also a civic culture that respects, honors and glorifies them and their ethos, and holds 
them blameless for faithfully serving the nation. In sum, our society strips those in 
uniform of responsibility for their contributions to state sponsored deadly force, and 
compensates for this divestiture by sustaining a culture honoring that divestiture.
Understandably, many military professionals have presumed it absolute and 
axiomatic that they are not to be in the business of determining whether there is due cause
for their killing people in their professional capacity. That extreme conception of their 
moral singularity is not a dogma of military professionalism. As with many other 
compatible or competing conceptions of that singularity, military professionalism neither 
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commands it nor condemns it. Instead, it both encourages that belief and discourages it. 
That belief is encouraged by a culture commanding an absolute, unquestioning respect 
for subservience to the civilian order. However what exactly is required by such respect --
whether it mandates some unquestioning acceptance of the wisdom and justice of civilian
directives – is open to question. That idea is called into question by professionalism’s 
Enlightenment ideals and principles of autonomy, open inquiry, and individual 
responsibility. 
The conflict here exemplifies the basic structure of the inherent ambivalence 
within military professionalism. Still, the cognitive, motivational, and emotional 
character of that ambivalence remains an abstraction without some accounting of some 
other salient peculiarities of the military. The remainder of this essay is devoted to 
providing that account, but the subject is immense, so the account here is only a 
beginning, a sketch. Throughout my intent is to understand before presuming to criticize 
and reform. The occasional sharp comments that may sound censorial are meant to jolt 
some recognition of some questionable features of this ethos, but not to answer those 
questions.  
Collectivization: Recall, the ethos of military professionals is structured by 
its subservience to the professionalization of the military, a corporate government agency.
Membership in a civilian profession is awarded for acquiring a distinctive expertise. The 
professional code is designed to bind and guide those and only those exercising the 
profession’s distinctive expertise. But membership in the military profession comes from 
membership in a professionalized military, a nation’s warrior agency. That agency needs 
some personnel with advanced warrior skills, but it also needs many personnel with 
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civilian skills who will not need any warrior skills. Military professional codes are 
designed to bind and guide all and only the uniformed members of a nation’s military, 
whatever their skills and expertise or lack thereof. 
Civilian professionals submit to their military's professional code as an additional 
code when plying their skills in military service. Being a military doctor (lawyer, etc.)  is 
not comparable to practicing two civilian professions like medicine and law. The activity 
as a military professional is not an additional concurrent employment, and not an 
employment of martial skills but only the practice of a civilian profession as a uniformed 
member of an agency whose function is military. (Indeed, a military's medical and 
priestly professionals are debarred by law from deploying martial skills in combat 
operations. ) Such civilian professionals may be licensed as military professionals by 
their commissioning as military officers. That status commits them to the professional 
code without assuming or implying their possession of any warrior skills or knowledge.
So too for their fellow professionals who have and employ expertise in warfare. 
Fleet admirals and infantry sergeants aren’t military professionals by dint of warrior 
skills, not unless their warrior’s will is subordinate to the state. They are held to their 
warrior code, not for having or employing warrior skills, but for their employment by a 
warrior agency. Military professionalism would be largely unfazed by out-sourcing to 
civilians all but the tasks employing martial expertise. There would remain the 
ambivalence in our military ethos between the ethos of civilian professionalism and the 
ethos of a warrior agency.14
Intrusion: But as things are, an additional strain is there to be felt by the 
many officers and enlisted personnel having no combat functions and no need or 
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possession of a distinctively warrior expertise. PMEE policy has been to imbue everyone 
in uniform with a single shared ethos, not just a code of conduct, but a spirit, 
temperament, sense of self, valuations of activities and character traits, etc – all of which 
are fitted for their contribution to the proficiency of people engaged in battles to the 
death. Few in uniform feel strained living by a shared ethic’s behavioral do’s and don’ts, 
but much of the military ethos relegates the non-warriors to a second-class status. The 
codes of those doing the same non-warrior work in civvies spotlight virtues other than 
those exalted in warriors. The PMEE we know trains personnel to live by and live up to 
the military’s ethos, whatever its disconnections from the non-warriors’ work and the 
kind of person they need to be to do it well and take pride in their own abilities, 
accomplishments, and their whole person. 
Our military anxiously rubs this sore spot, roaring reaffirmations over and over 
that everyone in uniform is a warrior. Some non-warriors happily hear their cog-like lives
so glorified and romanticized – and snap umbrageously at assaults on their self image. 
Others are not so able to fool themselves. They hear the authority’s words and feel a 
disconnect with their own day-to-day lives. They may ignore the noise when they can, 
and wrestle with cynicism and resentment. Meanwhile, properly proud warriors are 
frequently, fiercely unempathetic. They are comfortable in their own skins, living a 
reality confirming their self confidence. 
The military has its reasons for insistently instilling the self-identification of 
warriors uniformly, in everyone wearing the uniform. Armies and navies in battle live off 
a secure communal sense of totally invigorated togetherness. That disposition for the 
warriors’ shared shout appears to improve military proficiency. Yet, all the repetitive 
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emphasis on this shared self-conception seems indicative of anxiety about how well the 
teaching is taking – a disconcerting result when the teaching gets treated as self-evident, 
not open for doubt or debate. Such anxiety would be appropriate. We might reasonably 
expect that some stateside secretaries or mess hall supervisors would struggle to specify 
any aspect of their existence reminiscent of real warrior work, with its world of occasions
for heroism, honor, glory, gratitude, awe, adulation, and utter erotic power. It shouldn’t 
surprise anyone to learn that some feel sorely put down and put upon by harangues to 
deny their own eyes and judge themselves by standards suited for some other life. 
The emphatic reaffirmations of shared warriorhood seem indicative of some 
ignorance or indifference about the intrusiveness of it all. Hitherto, militaries of other eras
were not given to compunctions about personal intrusions. Political interest in such 
invasions of citizens’ selves is a peculiarity of Enlightenment culture, with its valorization
of individuality, authenticity, privacy, and personal autonomy. The increasing political 
interest is a trend that looks to loom ever larger for the military of a Jeffersonian 
democracy.15 
Our military is now more willing to refrain from what it deems unnecessary 
intrusiveness, but its ruling assumption remains that it can – and must -- be as controlling 
as it needs to be to instill the esprit de corps requisite for military proficiency and the 
salvation of the nation.  Under this banner of controlling on the job conduct, the military 
continues to presume the right and duty to take control of a person’s whole ethos, on and 
off the job. Predictably, the consequent habits of thought hardened in military leaders 
often hamper their capacity to recognize the impropriety of commanding their 
subordinates to submit to religious instruction and participate in religious practices. 
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Those habits were long abetted by civil society; the illegality of such commands was 
judicially recognized only relatively recently. The incidence of such commands, even 
after repeated, clear, authoritative judicial condemnation, testifies not to random 
outbreaks of religious fanaticism or uncommon religious zeal, but to the predisposition of
the military mind, its engrained presumption of a high duty to impose totalistic 
indoctrination to accomplish its mission. Currently, our Jeffersonian democracy limits 
that indoctrination only regarding matters deemed “religious”. That aside, our civic laws 
and social norms legitimize a whole world structured to inculcate patterns of moral 
thought and feeling that prioritize the motivations prioritized by the military’s 
organizational imperatives: obedience and loyalty.
Such intrusiveness and valorization of obedience and loyalty are not unique to the
military. They are not uncommon in religions, particularly those organized like military 
authoritarian hierarchies. But religiosity needn’t go that route. Unlike religions, states and
other institutions and organizations, militaries, by their very nature, favor hierarchical, 
authoritarian organization. No other organization has an inner imperative, an inherent 
goal like victory in battle that makes a comparable demand for that organizational form. 
(Organizations of civilian professionals tend in the opposite direction.)
Unlike most all other endeavors, military success is a matter of might, and 
military might has been mainly a matter of the sheer size of the force – and the skills of 
the commanders in managing masses of personnel. Of course, technological superiority 
may offset numerical superiority, but technological advantages tend to be short-lived. In 
any case, no other professional's success has been so dependent on sheer numbers. The 
development of human communities from scattered small tribes into kingdoms, empires, 
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and nation-states has fed and fed upon the development of massive militaries, now even 
in "peacetime". 
Generally, civilian professional expertise can be well exercised by independent 
individuals and small groups. While those professionals have increasingly united in 
organizations which acquire a life of their own with their own (alleged or real) inherent 
imperatives, there’s nothing like the same pressure toward organization, and still less for 
massive scale and authoritarianism. Civilian professionals may compete for clients, but 
their lives and nations aren't at risk from larger, competing practitioners. More 
importantly, the impetus toward organization is the opposite of that in the military. 
Doctors form medical groups and attorneys form laws firms so each practitioner can 
better serve his/her own clients, and, not coincidentally, have more clients to serve. 
Militaries grow larger to better serve their sole “client“, the state, not to improve their 
members’ abilities to serve their own clients or enlarge their base. In secular civilian 
professions, the individual practitioners are, metaphysically and morally, prior to +heir 
organizations. In the military, the individuals are professionals only by their membership 
in and complete subordination to the organization. So, the organizational imperatives are 
opposites in both their logic and content. 
Obedience:  The military profession, its ethos and educational programs are all 
in the service of and constrained by the inherent imperatives of an agency that must be 
huge yet tightly organized to operate effectively despite disruptions of every kind. Any 
rule-maker or commander intends her directives to be obeyed, but (rigorist religious 
orders excepted) no organization matches the military's valorization of sheer dutifulness, 
obedience, and unquestioning, cheerful compliance. To avoid the calamities attending 
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military failure, a military must aspire to be a monolithic organization maintaining close 
coordination despite every force and trick of Mother Nature and hostile nations. 
Disorganization and noncompliance can be lethal, catastrophic. Unity and conformity 
must be rigorously imposed and maintained. Cooperation and compliance must be 
automatic and unhesitant despite powerful, natural competing impulses. Habits of 
discipline – a steady propensity to be motivated by the mere fact of being commanded – 
must be inculcated. Occasions and latitude for dissent are limited. Fateful decisions 
cannot commonly be submitted to negotiation, bargaining, compromise or any protracted 
discussion. Meanwhile, law firms, medical groups, universities, religions, and states may 
tolerate and thrive on dissension and internal disharmony. 
All this can be and often has been overstated. Increased toleration and 
encouragement of debate and disagreement, loosening of command and control 
structures, and softening of the old blunt, emotionally blind ethos have resulted from 
professionalism’s valuation of liberated thought, technological innovations, alterations in 
the nature of military threats, and so on. Military organizational imperatives limit 
toleration and valorization of dissension, but what the genuine imperatives really 
demand, specifically and in detail, is increasingly controversial. 
Still, however adaptable, flexible and justified military professionalism may be, 
its spirit of subordination is foreign to the culture of civilian professions. While civilian 
codes seldom consider obedience a vice, neither is it found on any list of lead virtues. 
Obedience is a cardinal virtue of Boy Scouts, butlers, bellhops and bus boys, not 
responsible professionals. This stark contrast in the valuation of obedience is a cause and 
consequence of a stark contrast in the structure of moral reasoning. Traits of obedience 
227
are less prized by civilian professionals because obedience has such a restricted, 
peripheral role in their reasoning. Their decisions are not so controlled by a chain of 
command. Generally those decisions are evaluated by direct reference to the likely 
objective goods and evils they entail, and their compliance with universally applicable 
principles of liberal egalitarianism. 
Meanwhile, beginning with the absolute civilian control of the fundamental 
military decisions, then down the whole chain of command, officers and subordinates are 
systematically discouraged from the independent reasoning of civilian professionals, 
since it threatens to distract them from their paramount duty of compliance with the 
decisions of their superiors. Our military’s ethos can recognize that the duty of obedience 
is not completely absolute; some disobedience is justified. Still, it presumes that an order 
is to be obeyed, and that that presumption is not to be questioned without due cause. The 
first presumption is a defeasible premise in practical reasoning; the second is a constraint 
on the topics of reasoning. Questioning the presumption of obedience carries some risk. 
Doing so habitually is ill-advised for career advancement.
Predictably, it seems a tad unreasonable to the inhabitants of this moral universe 
when their professional obligations of obedience are regarded on a par with those of 
civilian professionals. After all, they have been trained to valorize obedience and respect 
its requirement as befits the morality befitting a military, a morality honored and 
sponsored by its legitimate civilian leaders, and the civic laws and social norms of a free, 
democratic society. 
Still, absolutist talk of the sacredness and sanctity of oaths, vows and contracts 
smacks of fanaticism.  Despite all the weight, strength and solemnity of military 
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obligation, its power to withstand all claims of justice and cries of humanity will be 
questionable in a nation justly proud of its creation by political revolution, and committed
to the principles of Nuremburg. Such questioning is within the limits of military 
professionalism, if not within the moral imagination of all military professionals.
Loyalty:  A military professional’s sense of the obligation of obedience – her metric
of its strength – is unnatural to civilian ethicists; an adequate feel for it is hard to acquire 
by classroom contemplation of hypothetical cases. It likely defies comprehension when 
abstracted from the peculiarities of the military’s emotional world
Our military ethos is not distillable into a single slogan: Salute smartly and obey! 
Its spirit is animated with an emotionality civilian professionalism need not and could not
inspire: the passions of intense loyalties, not one but a structure of loyalties to the nation, 
the government, the corps, and, most especially, to one’s own comrades. The military’s 
unmatched valuation of these loyalties is motivated by both the demands of military 
proficiency and the pressure to reduce the precariousness of its moral condition. These 
moral bonds and their attendant emotions may differentiate military professionalism from
civilian professionalism more profoundly than all else. Experientially it is a whole other 
world.
 In combat, conscientiousness alone won't cut it. With all its fog and fluidity, 
warriors cannot manage with nothing more than routines and compliance with explicit 
commands. Their lives depend on their reliance on one another. They've got to trust that 
each of them is moved by a genuine, profound concern for each other, ready to risk their 
lives for each other. To get the job done and/or survive, there's got to be an intense 
commitment to the corps and to one's unit and one's comrades: the team and each 
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individual.
Loyalty is needed to supplement obedience and also to sustain it. Military 
proficiency markedly declines when the sole motivation for obedience is brute fear. Any 
warrior code prizes loyalty as well as obedience. Our military did less of that a century 
ago, but militaries have long done far more of it than any civilian profession, and now 
must do more than ever as leadership by stark fear becomes less acceptable and effective.
All the loyalties the military prizes are forms of partiality whose consonance with 
Enlightenment universalism and the reciprocalism of our golden-rule Judaeo-Christian 
heritage is problematic. These commitments contend with a civic culture that honors 
patriotism (and nationalism too), while also trumpeting the Brotherhood of Man and 
calling everyone to render the same basal care and regard for everyone regardless of such
accidents of circumstance as gender, race, ethnicity, national origin – and national 
affiliation. Military professionals must reconcile the ideal of egalitarian universalism with
their defining commitment to their own nation and their comrades. They declare 
themselves willing – indeed, honor bound -- to obliterate people of other nations when so 
ordered and to die in the process if need be. There is no more profound expression of 
favoritism than the oath of military allegiance. 16
The tensions between the partiality of loyalties and the universalism and 
cosmopolitanism of Enlightenment ethics present little conflict for civilian professionals, 
for (a) their favoritism benefits their clients generally without threatening grave harm to 
others, (b) their clients can be anyone and (c) they generally need not have deep 
commitments to coworkers, a corporate agency, or government. 
Civilian professionals commonly have special obligations to their clients, and 
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their codes prescribe loyalties to the client beyond the contractual commitments. 
Normally, those obligations and loyalties are consequences of the professional-client 
relation, not a cause or precondition of it. The client is often a stranger with no prior 
claim on the professional. The professional’s commitments are creatures of the relation, 
and generally terminate with its termination. The client is well and dutifully served 
without the professional being the client's servant, but instead an independent, 
autonomous agent bound by her code to act on her best professional judgment in the 
client's best interests, even, in some cases, against the client's wishes.
Civilian professionals may truly love to help people and love doing it with their 
hard-earned skills. This may be particularly admirable when they're not out to care for 
particular individuals they have personal reasons to care about: their favored clients may 
be whoever is neediest. Civilian professionals may have admirable motives but not an 
analogue of patriotism or other warrior loyalties. Admirable it may be for physicians to 
have heartfelt concerns for their patients, and teachers for their students, but we haven’t 
the same need or expectation of their deep and lasting attachments as we do for an 
officer’s love of her country. With civilian professionals, the temptations of betrayal 
aren’t so frequent or formidable; their enticement by our enemies is unlikely. Significant 
emotional attachment comforts a client, but generally a decent wage, or if need be a hefty
one, is incentive enough to secure steady professional performance.
Some adults soldier like children at play, without caring whom or what they 
soldier for. That attitude, acceptable, even admirable in civilian professions, is not a 
virtue of noble warriors. Nowadays, few adults wish to be soldiers apart from a 
willingness to serve their country when it is threatened. The arms-length commercial 
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allegiances of mercenary troops to their client-employer must be exceptional in the 
military. A state cannot rely entirely on a military with only monetary motivations for fear
that the mercenaries might simply seize the nation’s wealth. The government must be the 
commander of its military, not a mere client. Its military personnel are its servants, not 
free-lancing pros.17 An egalitarian democracy cannot reliably command its military 
personnel unless they usually enter the service with an allegiance secured, not by oath or 
greed or fear alone, but by motivations like patriotism that are not creatures of contract or
calculation of self-interest. Bereft of such motivations, bare oaths bear little credence.
Military professionals take pride in their selflessness, their subordination and 
submergence of self. They think it a submission with greater nobility than a vassal's 
servility. The submission is a surrender and liberation, a total identification with The 
Corps! The Corps! A military professional may think of himself, day to day, dawn to 
dusk, down to his core, as, say, a Marine. 
Civilian professional counterparts are pallid shadows and not prescribed by their 
codes. A doctor may think of herself as a doctor. It's what she proudly does, what she 
proudly is, what she devotes and shapes her life to being. She may develop bonds with 
co-workers and co-professionals, but normally nothing more than the bonds 
nonprofessionals make in their work. (Consider what it would take to spread a fierce 
conviction: We dentists have got to stick together!) As for the AMA, her allegiance is 
likely negligible, and her identification with it null. To her hospital she may have more 
allegiance, but it's rarely deep and is generally readily transferable. And however 
substantial the allegiance, exceptional circumstances are needed for her to think of 
herself, on and off the job, primarily in terms of her affiliation to that organization. The 
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spirit of such institutions is not a martial espirit de corps. The conscience of its personnel 
doesn't hark to Hooah or any remotely comparable call. A properly professionalized 
military mind must do precisely that – or so it now supposes.
 When the question is whether to serve at all, patriotism is the first loyalty to come
in play. Fans of war may stand on a three-legged patriotism, shifting from stance to 
stance. Sometimes they speak to the unconverted with a vulnerable faith that premises 
their nation’s righteousness unbroken or in the instance. Sometimes they speak to 
themselves, sharing a faith premising national exceptionalism. Sometimes they proclaim 
a loyalty that premises itself as sufficient justification. 
Patriotism in itself has little content beyond its egocentrism. It motivates pursuit 
of the nation’s self-interest, but patriotic fervor may move us whatever our conception of 
the nation’s interests. Bare love of country never tells us when to war. It can only 
motivate acceptance and execution of a decision made on some other grounds. Patriotism 
powers us to support, fervently and mindlessly, whatever the nation and its military do, 
and not just going to war.  It influences the rest of the military world by this 
conservatism, its proud acceptance and glorification of what its civilian and military 
leaders put before it.  
Patriots may think their passion legitimates their military’s plying its skills when 
their impersonal reasons for warring run out – as though their trust in their nation’s 
righteousness were a reason for foreigners to presume the same rather than retain the 
foreigners’ patriotic trust in their own nation’s righteousness. Each patriot’s love and trust
can legitimate only his/her own acceptance of the authority of a decision, and support of 
its execution. The natural prejudice of a patriot’s perspective is the presumption of the 
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righteousness of furthering one’s nation’s interests. That partiality may acknowledge that,
looked at impartially, that presumption may be epistemically groundless, and in any 
particular case it may be mistaken and indefensible. Still, patriots insist that patriotism is 
a virtue, most especially in a military leader, and that loyalty demands trust in and 
support of one’s nation’s pursuits despite evidence and argument to the contrary. Vaguely 
stated, some such favoritism may be universalizable and impartially approved. One risk 
of the military's culture of uniformity and instant submission to authority is a sclerosis of 
the patriot's cognitive stance: a tightly blinkered trust in their nation's commanders, a 
steady propensity to presume that, despite appearances to the contrary, they mean well 
and know what they are doing. The oaths of officers and voluntary enlistees may also 
oblige them to trust and maintain faith, and military professionals might understandably 
believe that any distrust is inconsistent with the sacredness of those vows. That stance 
seems respectable until it becomes absolutist, brooking no conceivable exceptions, and 
dismissive of any demand to explain why the sanctity of those vows transcends all their 
other bonds of justice, humanity and decency.
Love of country commonly overpowers love of mankind. Both affections pale 
before the famed bonding of comrades in arms. No other occupation induces coworker 
ties of comparable depth and intensity. That bonding is said to motivate more heroic 
sacrifice than all else. It may as frequently motivate less noble conduct. Patriotism may 
make for a willingness to serve. The more personal loyalties may make for an 
unwillingness to refuse service. 
There is a profound disgrace in departing from a communal ethos obsessively 
insistent on obedience, loyalty, team spirit.  An officer can expect (mostly if not 
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exclusively) condemnation from fellow professionals and the nation for refusing to serve 
when he/she sincerely judges a war wrongful. Of course (it is near tautological), such 
refusal may be deemed permissible, even obligatory, by those who deem the wrong 
sufficiently blatant and heinous. That possibility is academic. Governments aren’t wont to
wage wars they expect to be generally condemned by officers and citizenry. Military 
professionalism recognizes that, in theory, refusal to participate may be honorable. In 
practice, only officers of our enemies (Nazi Germany is the paradigm) get condemned. 
Resignation on grounds of conscience is lawful – in some circumstances. In others, 
especially in wartime, all exits are blocked. Even when lawful, it is hardly reputable. The 
toll down that road is stiff. However sincere and agonized, the choice is mostly 
condemned (loudly or quietly) and rarely admired by professional peers or the press and 
the folks back home. The catch-22 comes with the details of concrete cases. There the 
purity of moral judgment is inextricably entwined with political judgments. Thus, the 
callings of conscience can be silenced by labeling them “political”. 
The disrepute of resignation, refusal, civil disobedience, and any noisy or 
disruptive dissent in the military is rooted in the loyalties sustained by the military ethos. 
However conscientious, dissent is bound to look like betrayal. And that cannot but rattle 
the certainty of one's convictions. It all calls for pig-headed courage.
This last remark and others might be read as offering no more than an excuse for 
participating in shameful warring. Doctrinaire individualists, I take it, recognize loyalty 
as a justification, not a mere excuse, only insofar as the object of loyalty is deserving; 
loyalty itself is deemed to have little or no value apart from the value of its object. That is
an uncommon, attenuated conception of loyalty. The common conception is that one test 
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of true loyalty is a willingness to stand by its object despite its wrongdoing – not all 
wrongdoing, but some nontrivial wrongdoing. Individualists are properly puzzled by this:
if neither B nor C has a right to harm D, how could B’s loyalty to C give B a right to aid 
C’s harming D? Doubtless it doesn’t: rights are matters of justice, and when loyalty 
conflicts with justice it cannot claim any rights. Loyalty might still have some value, 
merit some respect, and justify some complicity in some injustice. How that could be has 
never been explained, but neither has it been shown to be impossible.
Conclusion: Despite the absurdity of combatant moral equality, Walzer might 
be sufficiently vindicated if military professionalism needs some conception of its moral 
singularity and some such conception is intelligible. I have suggested that Walzer is right 
to that extent, but military professionalism cannot well commit to any specific 
conception, because it is committed to competing imperatives.  I close with two final 
suggestions. 
Perhaps the moral circumstance of the uniformed among us, with its political 
isolation, oaths and loyalties and obligations of obedience, justifies only a moral 
presumption against condemning their participating in some condemnable wars.  This 
presumption needs no unreasonable assumption that their government always acts rightly 
or is doing so here and now. The presumption might stand despite the government’s 
decision being reasonably deemed very bad (yet not horrifically evil) if that decision does
not exceed or jeopardize the legitimacy of that decision’s authority. That modest 
presumption is not easily rebutted in a relatively well-ordered society like the USA.
Further, perhaps something of that presumption might be sustained for a military 
ruled by a regime with lesser moral legitimacy. I have supposed that if a well-ordered 
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society properly sponsors and honors totalistic indoctrination of an authoritarian moral 
code to secure the proficiency of its means of survival, then those subject to that training 
may justifiably live by that code. So, while we may often properly condemn gross 
violations of Enlightenment principles in the civilian world of other societies, perhaps we
cannot so freely condemn such societies or their governments for sponsoring and 
honoring the inculcation of the same military mindset. If so, perhaps we best recognize 
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not morally disadvantaged by any such impartial presumption. Further, while police may resort to 
violence to accomplish their mission, usually they need not and commonly do not use violence – let 
alone lethal force – or other presumptively condemnable means.
5
  Whether combat (actual or threatened) occurs in something properly called a “war” or something 
“other than war” matters little here. Shifts in the specific warrior skills most needed and honored may 
influence the flavor of a military’s ethos, but not its core. However, for military and police agencies 
alike, the equipment and skills acquired for proficiency in their defining mission make them the natural
go-to-guys for all kinds of situations remote from that mission, and this inevitable systemic mission 
creep has its costs, immediate and long term. Bearing arms may be prudent to discourage violence 
when resolving family disputes and delivering humanitarian aid, but it may also provoke violence or 
otherwise risk poisoning the atmosphere and making the mission more difficult. In any event, 
routinizing such missions may strain the personnel’s preferred self-image as warriors or crime-fighters, 
and tax morale. The consequences for the occupational ethos may be substantial but cannot be explored
here.
6
  Cf. David Rodin's War and Self-Defense (Oxford, 2002), which debunks the commonly assumed 
conjunction in its title.
7
 The closest civilian counterpart is the work of executioners. The telling contrast is that government 
executioners in our tradition have commonly preferred anonymity, often wearing masks when they 
work in public. Our culture has rarely celebrated these workers even when riotously celebrating a 
hanging or beheading. Our warriors are not to be executioners. Nowadays they are prohibited from 
killing disabled prisoners. (Nuremburg war criminals had civilian executioners.)  An executioner’s 
proficiency may win admiration from her peers but not public adulation and glory. Killing someone 
bound and disabled needs minimal skill. Opportunities for displaying courage, heroism or much else 
beyond conscientiousness and self-mastery or callousness are exceptional, occasioned by some broken 
routine. Society pays executioners a fair wage, convinced that this work is worth it, that it must be 
done. Society cannot well call it dishonorable work. But it doesn’t honor it either. Even when deemed 
needed, it seems ignoble. 
8
 Many dream of the day when the world is rightly ruled by some single legitimate authority whose 
military polices our Earth and brings to justice any who disturb its peace or threaten its order. Among 
its bounty of boons, in this fantasy the moral precariousness of warriors disappears since this military 
has become a law enforcement agency whose personnel are police.  (Cf. note 3 supra.)  However 
realistic this possibility, it suggests no solution of the moral worries of current military professionals. 
9
 Throughout I let fly grand historical hypothesis with the unscholarly abandon of other philosophers 
who presume the propriety of arm chair social science that offers illuminating connections among 
familiar, apparently scattered facts. In the present instance, I rest with a challenge to those friends of 
the military skeptical of its moral precariousness to explain the popularity of conceptions of it moral 
singularity.
10
 There’s no end to the conceptual and moral dilemmas here. Walzer claims to believe that the 
American soldiers’ and sailors’ right to life was not violated by the Japanese pilots. He supposes they 
were wronged (if at all) only by the leaders, not by the pilots, because those pilots were executing the 
commands of their nation’s legitimate authorities. That makes no sense unless those pilots are regarded 
as nothing more than weapons guidance mechanisms by which their leaders achieved their aims -- but 
that makes it nonsensical to say that those pilots had a right to kill their targets, or to attribute any rights
at all to them. Apparently, Walzer (and McMahan too, but not Schoonhoven) thinks we must think and 
talk this way to make sense of our war conventions and traditional principles of jus in bello presuppose 
this conception. Actually, our established laws and dominant moral doctrines make perfect sense -- 
historically, politically, legally, morally and conceptually – apart from any close variant of Walzer’s 
conception. The whole notion of combatants having a legal right to kill (assault, maim, imprison, etc) 
misconceives international law, for the alleged “right” is devoid of any legal content or consequence. 
The sole suggestion of such a legal right is the prohibition of the punishment or any abuse of captive 
combatants. Yet, what has actually motivated and fully justified governments around the world to 
establish and maintain that prohibition are considerations of national self-interest entirely independent 
of any idea of combatant moral equality or a right of all combatants to kill one another.  Further, all this
must also be said regarding those pilots killing 68 American civilians at Pearl Harbor. Some if not all of
those civilians are paradigm cases of noncombatant casualties of aggression legitimated by our war 
conventions. We prohibit punishing the pilots for those killings just as we prohibit punishing them for 
killing uniformed personnel, and for much the same reasons of national self-interest. On Walzer’s 
reading (which McMahan accepts) our war rules and jus in bello orthodoxy must suppose that the pilots
had a legal and moral right to kill those noncombatants (albeit unintentionally) and did not wrong them.
Worse yet, those victims cannot even be the “moral equals” of their assailants, for they can have no 
right to assail their assailants except by forfeiting their “protected” status as noncombatants.  These and
most all of my criticisms of Walzer are explained more fully in my “Reconnoitering Combatant Moral 
Equality”, Journal of Military Ethics 6, no. 1 (2007).
11
  Cf. http://www.caii.com/CAIIStaff/Dashboard_GIROAdminCAIIStaff/Dashboard_
CAIIAdminDatabase/resources/ghai/toolbox6.htm.
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  For example, a professional ethos is determined importantly by the profession’s distinctive skills. Far
more than with other crafts, the concept of warrior skills is an empty abstraction apart from some 
specified tool kit. Many medical skills of ancient practitioners are still relevant in high tech health care,
but nuclear submarine commanders have little call for expertise at hand-to-hand combat. The means of 
killing many people is a markedly more odd lot assortment of tools and actions than the means of 
achieving the goals of other professions like restoring health or imparting knowledge. No private army 
could be allowed command of any more than a miniature of our military’s armamentarium. That 
massive difference in power sustains markedly different tones of martial spirit.
13
 Cf. Zupan, Ibid. 
14The centrality of the organization in military professionalization gets expressed in the current idiom of
our soldiers, who now find it natural to talk of their membership in, not (just) the military profession -- 
aka the profession of arms -- but (also or instead) the Army Profession. That term sounds weird to 
civilian ears; its meaning is not immediately grasped.  Soldiers write essays wondering whether the 
Army is an organization or a profession. (The question is repeatedly discussed in essays of the USMA 
anthology, The Future of the Army Profession, ed. Lloyd J. Matthews, McGraw-Hill, 2002.) The answer
is that the profession is the organization. No comparable question arises in civilian professions; no 
sense can be made of the question in that context. 
15
 Professionalization has many effects, affecting military personnel differently. The differential impacts
just alluded to cut across national militaries and service branches. Other differences are due to a corps’ 
history. Each military’s ethos gets its specific content and flavor from its professionalization within a 
thick historical context. The fine discriminations and valuations needed for applying essential, 
essentially vague notions like “conduct unbecoming” and “good order and discipline” are not deducible
from abstract principles of liberal egalitarianism or professionalization alone. The 18th and 19th 
century European militaries professionalizing themselves had centuries of traditions as paradigms of 
aristocratic culture. Their movements needed no devotion to the egalitarian liberalism nurturing civilian
professionalization, but only an Enlightenment openness to questioning their traditions. Early American
military leadership created a new military world by tweaking the best practices of Europe’s aristocratic 
military heritages. That world has always harbored more traces of aristocracy than any other in 
America. Our Army officers today may (perhaps not unreasonably) think they’ve shed more of their 
aristocratic baggage than their Navy counterparts, but everywhere old habits of thought and feeling 
perpetuate themselves by their unnoticed influence on the interpretation and application of liberal 
egalitarian principles in specific cases.
Yet, while the processes and products of professionalization are conditioned by historical 
circumstances, the world-wide trend toward military professionalization tends to lessen the influence of
military legacies and increase the homogeneity of militaries. At the same time, this tendency toward 
uniformity is countered by professionalism’s intellectual predispositions that encourages 
experimentation, dissent and innovation and discourages rigidity and dogmatism, even in the 
conception of professionalism. By its own nature professionalism tends not to be a single or 
unchanging ethos. So, a highly abstract analysis of the logic of professional, such as the present one, 
risks oversimplification and falsification.
16
  For what may be the most illuminating, and must be the wittiest, elucidation of the implications of a 
universalized patriotism or nationalism, cf: Curtis Stalbank, “I'm Prepared To Give My Life For This 
Or Any Country”, The Onion, 3/28/07, 
http://www.theonion.com/content/opinion/im_prepared_to_give_my_life_for.
17I have heard it said that the government (or nation) is the military’s client, and, by transitivity, the 
clientele of its members is the state or its citizenry. That sophistry is the joke in approaching a cop and 
saying: “You’re a public servant and I want my shoes shined, so snap to.” Military professionals do not 
have clients. Officers have subordinates but no clients. They are managers of a professionalized 
government agency. (There is nothing ignoble in this: football Quarterbacks have no clients either.) The
government or nation is no more a client of the military than it is a client of the Department of State or 
Commerce. 
